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INTRODUCTION
For more than a century, extraterritorial application of United
States antitrust laws has vexed federal courts. Although the Sherman
Act—the statutory bedrock of antitrust law—outlaws restraints of
trade or commerce with foreign nations, courts have traveled a
circuitous route to determine the precise scope of foreign trade and
commerce. In one of the earliest Supreme Court cases involving the
intersection of foreign commerce and the Sherman Act, Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes applied the canon of statutory interpretation known
as the “presumption against extraterritoriality” to the Sherman Act.1
He concluded that an exclusive link between the laws passed by
 J.D. candidate, May 2013, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; A.M., in progress, University of Chicago; B.A., 1997, University of
Virginia. The author would like to thank Amanda Caplan for her tireless support and
patience.
1
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909) (“The
foregoing considerations would lead, in case of doubt to a construction of any statute
as intended to be confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits over
which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power.”).
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Congress and the territory of the United States prevented the
application of the Sherman Act to conduct occurring in foreign
countries. Less than forty years later, Judge Learned Hand took a
different approach, holding that the Sherman Act applies to foreign
conduct that produces an “effect” on commerce in the United States.2
In 1982, after seventy years of courts wrestling with this issue,
Congress passed the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act
(“FTAIA”) with the hope of providing a stable guide to the
extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act.3 Despite the passage of the
FTAIA, the controversy over applying U.S. law to individuals and
entities in foreign countries did not subside. Indeed, the FTAIA’s
cumbersome language posed new problems for the courts. One
particular issue that arose was whether the law stripped federal courts
of their subject-matter jurisdiction over certain antitrust claims; or,
alternatively, whether the law merely added an element to a cause of
action brought under the Sherman Act, with no effect on a court’s
jurisdiction.
This Case Note examines this “jurisdiction/element” divide
through the lens of Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., a recent case
decided by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en banc during
the summer of 2012.4 In Minn-Chem, the Seventh Circuit sided
squarely with the interpretation that the FTAIA provides an element of
an antitrust claim. The court’s holding has particular consequences on
civil procedure, statutory interpretation, and the extraterritorial
application of U.S. antitrust laws. The decision also is momentous, in
part, because it overturns the Seventh Circuit’s 2003 holding in United
Phosphorus Ltd. v. Angus Chemical Company, where the court held
that the FTAIA proscribes subject-matter jurisdiction.5 The MinnChem decision also adopted a test to determine whether foreign
2

United States v. Aluminum Co. Of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.

1945).
3

15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006).
Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
5
United Phosphorus Ltd. V. Angus Chemical Company, 322 F.3d 942 (7th Cir.
2003) (en banc).
4
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antitrust conduct has a “direct” effect on United States domestic or
import commerce. Under the Seventh Circuit’s definition, conduct that
has a “proximate causal nexus” with an effect on United States
commerce is “direct.” That definition conflicts with the one adopted
by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that requires conduct to have an
“immediate consequence” in order for it to have a “direct” effect.6
This Note argues that the Seventh Circuit made the right decision
in Minn-Chem. The rationale provided in Judge Diane Wood’s opinion
goes a long way toward justifying the categorization of the FTAIA as
an “element-establishing” statute. Among those reasons is the desire to
establish a bright-line distinction between statutes addressing subjectmatter jurisdiction and statutes regulating conduct. This distinction
makes the judicial process more efficient because it guides courts and
litigators on the proper application of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
This Note also adds to those reasons by focusing on the global context
of the extraterritorial enforcement of antitrust law. In particular, it
argues that the Minn-Chem decision’s “direct” effect test adopted by
the Seventh Circuit effectively serves the purpose of United States
antitrust laws.
Part I of this Note introduces the Sherman Antitrust Act and the
FTAIA, the two statutes at issue in the Minn-Chem decision. Part II
then traces the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the FTAIA along
with the “jurisdiction/element” distinction in statutory interpretation
beginning with Justice Scalia’s dissent in Hartford Fire Insurance Co.
v. California through the Court’s decision in Morrison v National
Australia Bank. Part III reviews the Seventh Circuit’s experience with
the FTAIA in United Phosphorus and in Minn-Chem. Part IV analyzes
the Minn-Chem decision’s impact on civil procedure, statutory
interpretation, and extraterritorial antitrust enforcement. A brief
conclusion follows.

6

U.S. v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 681 (9th Cir. 2004).
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I. THE STATUTORY FOUNDATION
A. The Sherman Act
The statutory basis for antitrust law in the United States begins
with the Sherman Act of 1890.7 The text of §1 of the Sherman Act
declares “restraints of trade” brought about through contracts,
agreements, or conspiracies illegal.8 Similarly, § 2 of the Sherman Act
applies to restraints of trade that arise from monopolistic abuses.9
The law explicitly prohibited acts restraining trade in the course
of “commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations.”10
However, what Congress meant by “commerce with foreign nations”
was not entirely clear, even within the first few decades after the law’s
enactment.11 Over the years courts wrestled with that phrase, and, in
1982, Congress eventually attempted to establish specific parameters
on the extent of the Sherman Act’s extraterritorial reach with the
FTAIA.

7

15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006).
See id. § 1.
9
See id. § 2.
10
See id. § 1.
11
See e.g., American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909)
(holding that the Sherman Act does not apply to conduct in Costa Rica and Panama);
but see, U.S. v. Pacific A & R & Nav. Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913) (holding that the
Sherman Act applied to a seafaring shipping company operating between the United
States and Canada); Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917) (holding that the
Sherman Act applied because antitrust violation occurred in United States territory
despite the fact that company alleged to violate the Act was formed in a foreign
country); U.S. v Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927) (distinguishing American
Banana on the fact that the Sherman Act applies where a “contract, combination, and
conspiracy” was entered into in the United States as opposed to acts only occurring
in foreign countries).
8
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B. The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982
1. History of the Act
For over ninety years after the passage of the Sherman Act,
federal courts were left with the task of determining the scope of
foreign commerce covered by the law. In the late 1970s and early
1980s, Congress debated and then adopted a statutory definition in the
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982.12 The House
Judiciary Committee report on the FTAIA explained that the impetus
for the legislation was a perception among U.S. business leaders that
American antitrust laws hindered American export commerce.13 The
Judiciary Committee also found concern among some commentators
that the legal test used to determine whether American antitrust law
applied to a foreign transaction was ambiguous, leading to inconsistent
judicial decisions on what effects on the domestic economy warranted
U.S. regulation over a foreign transaction.14 Although the Judiciary
Committee heard conflicting testimony regarding these two concerns,
it nonetheless chose to adopt a law intended to clarify the matter.15
According to the conference report, the standard articulated in the
statute would remedy the perceived inconsistencies of the legal test
formulated in the case law.16
2. Text of the Act
The text of the FTAIA is as follows:
Sections 1 to 7 of this title shall not apply to conduct involving
trade or commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) with
foreign nations unless—
12

15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006).
H.R. Rep. No. 97-686, at 6 (1982).
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
13
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(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect—
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with
foreign nations; or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a
person engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of
sections 1 to 7 of this title, other than this section.
If sections 1 to 7 of this title apply to such conduct only because
of the operation of paragraph 1(B), then sections 1 to 7 of this title
shall apply to such conduct only for injury to export business in the
United States.17
A bit of translation is in order. The statute begins with a chapeau
expressing the blanket limitation on the reach of the Sherman Act as
embodied in the United States Code.18 The relevant code sections do
not apply to conduct affecting trade or commerce with foreign nations,
markets, consumers, or producers.19 The chapeau also includes a
caveat in the parenthetical that the Sherman Act applies to import trade
or commerce.20 The statute then defines the category of conduct in
foreign commerce that is subject to the Sherman Act.21 If there is
conduct regulated by the Sherman Act that involves foreign
commerce, and that conduct has a “direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect” on commerce within the United States, or on export
commerce from the United States, then the antitrust laws are
applicable.22 In the situations where that conduct causes an injury to

17

15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006).
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION, § 272i (3d ed. 2006);
see, e.g., F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 162 (2004).
19
AREEDA, supra note 18, § 272i.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
18
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export commerce, then the antitrust laws are only applicable to those
injuries that occur in the United States.23
II. EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND JURISDICTION IN FEDERAL COURTS
At the heart of the legal dispute in Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc.
is whether the FTAIA proscribes a federal court’s jurisdiction over
extraterritorial applications of antitrust law, or, alternatively, whether
the statute defines the merits upon which a cause of action may
succeed.24 This section describes the lay-of-the-land regarding recent
Supreme Court decisions aimed at refining precisely what is meant by
the legal term “jurisdiction.” The starting point is Justice Scalia’s
influential dissent in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,25 the
first Supreme Court case to discuss the FTAIA. The next case is F.
Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A.,26 the only Supreme Court
case where the FTAIA was directly at issue. Discussion then turns to
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corporation,27 a Title VII sex discrimination case28
that turned on whether certain threshold requirements defining
“employer” implicated federal subject-matter jurisdiction.29 The
section concludes with Morrison v. National Australia Bank,30 which
dealt with whether § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193431
could be applied extraterritorially.

23
24

Id.
Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 851 (7th Cir. 2012) (en

banc).
25

Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 800-21 (1993).
F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S 155, 155 (2004).
27
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corporation, 546 U.S. 500 (2006).
28
See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66
(codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2).
29
Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 503.
30
Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 130 S.Ct. 2869 (2010).
31
Pub. L. 106-554, 48 Stat. 891 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. § 78j).
26
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A. Justice Scalia’s Dissent in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California
What does “jurisdiction” mean? Justice Thomas provides a simple
definition: “‘Jurisdiction’ refers to ‘adjudicatory authority.’”32 This
“authority” relates to the persons (personal jurisdiction) who are
subject to a court’s authority, and the classes of cases (subject-matter
jurisdiction) a court may decide.33 Without adjudicatory authority a
court lacks the power to decide a case.34 Thus, when a federal court
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1)35 permits a motion to dismiss a claim for that reason at any
point during litigation, even after a jury returns a verdict.36 This
description of jurisdiction may be self-evident to anyone familiar with
Federal Rules of Civil Procedures. But what may be clear in theory
has become murky in practice because courts have been less than
precise when deciding whether an issue is properly characterized as
jurisdictional.37

32

Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick, 130 S.Ct. 1237, 1243 (2010) (quoting Kontrick
v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004) (Ginsburg, J. dissenting)).
33
Reed Elsevier, 130 S.Ct. at 1243. For the purposes of brevity and simplicity,
this discussion of adjudicative jurisdiction is necessarily limited to these forms of
jurisdiction. Other forms of adjudicative jurisdiction, including, but not limited to,
diversity and supplemental jurisdiction, although important in their own right, are
neither necessary nor particularly pertinent to the analysis in this Case Note.
34
Id.
35
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).
36
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); see also 5B
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1350 (3d ed. 2013).
37
See, e.g., Howard M. Wasserman, The Demise of “Drive-By Jurisdictional
Rulings,” 105 NW. U. L. REV. 947 (2011) (“These [four] cases [decided in 2009 and
2010] continue an almost uninterrupted retreat from the Court’s admittedly
‘profligate’ and ‘less than meticulous’ use of the word ‘jurisdiction’ and a move
towards ‘discipline’ in the use of the term.”) (referring to Morrison, 130 S.Ct. at
2877; United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 S.Ct. 1367, 1377-78 (2010);
Reed Elsevier, 130 S.Ct. at 1241; Union Pacific R. Co. v. Locomotive Eng’rs, 558
U.S. 67, 71-72 (2009).
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For this discussion on jurisdiction, the pertinent issue in Hartford
Fire was whether a federal court could decline to hear a case dealing
with the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act based on the
principle of “international comity.”38 Under this principle, a United
States court will abstain from adjudicating a cause of action because,
among other reasons, foreign law may be better suited to address the
matter, or an application of United States law might interfere with the
application of the foreign country’s law.39 The petitioners, which
included London-based reinsurers, argued that British insurance laws
sufficiently regulated them such that the adjudication of the Sherman
Act claims in a United States court would create a conflict of laws that
the principle of international comity was meant to prevent.40 Writing
for the majority, Justice Souter found no conflict between United
States and British law in the matter before the Court.41 Thus, the
majority held that the principle of international comity did not bar the
district court from adjudicating the case.42 As to whether the FTAIA
had any effect on the application of the principle of international
comity, Justice Souter noted that the legislative history indicated that
the FTAIA did not preclude such an inquiry.43 However, this aside on
the FTAIA was merely dicta.44
The portion of Justice Scalia’s dissent that addresses the
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act begins by agreeing with
the majority that the federal district court had subject-matter

38

Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 794-99 (1993).
See, e.g., 44B AM. JUR. 2D International Law § 8 (2007) (“The principle of
international comity is an abstention doctrine, which at its base involves the
recognition that there are circumstances in which the application of foreign law may
be more appropriate than the application of United States law. Thus, under the
doctrine of international comity, courts sometimes defer to laws or interests of a
foreign country and decline to exercise the jurisdiction they otherwise have.”).
40
Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 798-99.
41
Id. at 799.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 798.
44
Id.
39

258
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2013

9

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 3

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 8, Issue 2

Spring 2013

jurisdiction over the Sherman Act claims in the case.45 However,
Justice Scalia parted company with the majority’s analysis by finding
instead that “28 U.S.C.§ 1331 vests district courts with subject-matter
jurisdiction over cases ‘arising under’ federal statutes.”46 Therefore,
because the Sherman Act is a federal law, the district court could hear
the Sherman Act claims made by the plaintiffs.47
The bone of contention between the dissent and the majority was
whether the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction had anything to do with
the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act.48 For Justice Scalia,
the proper investigation for the Court was not whether a court had the
power to adjudicate, but rather to determine whether, and to what
extent, Congress extended its power to regulate conduct occurring in
foreign countries.49 The practical implication of this distinction arises
within the procedure litigants are to follow when addressing the
FTAIA’s effect on a case.50 A defendant in a civil antitrust suit who
disputes a federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over a Sherman
Act claim must move for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1).51 Under a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the judge acts as
a neutral fact finder with discretion to consider facts outside of the
pleadings pertaining to jurisdiction.52 Instead, under Justice Scalia’s
interpretation, what was once thought to be a “jurisdictional” issue is
actually an issue of substantive law, requiring a ruling on whether the
plaintiff has stated a cause of action.53 This interpretation requires a
defendant to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).54 For a 12(b)(6) analysis,
the judge must confine her analysis to the facts contained in the
45

Id. at 812 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 813.
49
Id.
50
AREEDA, supra note 18, § 272.1a.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 813; see also, AREEDA, supra note 18, § 272.1a.
54
AREEDA, supra note 18, § 272.1a.
46
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pleadings alone.55 Furthermore, the judge must examine the pleadings
in the light most favorable to the non-movant, the plaintiff.56
Justice Scalia argued that for any federal statute, not just the
Sherman Act, a court should use canons of statutory construction to
determine whether Congress’s legislative jurisdiction permits
extraterritorial application of the law.57 The first canon he suggested a
court should consider is the “presumption against extraterritoriality.”58
Under this canon, a court assumes that legislation passed by Congress
only applies within the territory of the United States, unless a contrary
intent appears.59 However, despite Justice Scalia’s misgivings, this
presumption does not apply to the Sherman Act because precedent has
established that the Sherman Act does apply to conduct occurring in
foreign countries.60
Second, Justice Scalia suggested that the court interpret a law so
that it does not conflict with international law.61 Within the specific
area of antitrust law, courts have stated fealty to this principle while
nonetheless holding that the Sherman Act applies to conduct in foreign
countries.62 It is within this form of statutory analysis—not an analysis
of the court’s adjudicative authority—that the principle of
“international comity” should enter into the picture.63 To Scalia, the
55

Id.
Id.
57
Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 814.
58
Id.; see, e.g., American Banana v. United Fruit, 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909).
59
Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 814.
60
Id. (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S 574,
582, fn. 6 (1986); Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S.
690, 704 (1962); see also United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), 148
F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)).
61
Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 815-16 (citing Murray v. Schooner Charming
Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (quoting EEOC v. Arabian American Oil
Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 264 (1991)).
62
Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 816-17 (citing Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443).
63
Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 817-18 (“Considering comity [as a matter of
statutory construction] is just part of determining whether the Sherman Act prohibits
the conduct at issue.”).
56
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first question in Hartford Fire, therefore, was not whether a court
should decline to exercise jurisdiction because the matter may be more
appropriately adjudicated in a foreign court. Rather, it was whether the
law enacted by Congress regulated conduct occurring in a foreign
country.64 Once a court concludes that a law does reach extraterritorial
conduct then an inquiry into international comity may begin. Justice
Scalia then turned to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
of the United States for guidance on whether international comity
limits the Sherman Act’s extraterritorial reach.65 He concluded that it
does,66 but not without expressing his dismay with the majority’s
handling of the comity analysis:
It is evident from what I have said that the Court’s comity
analysis, which proceeds as though the issue is whether the
courts should ‘decline to exercise . . . jurisdiction,’ . . . rather
than whether the Sherman Act covers this conduct, is simply
misdirected. . . . It is not realistic, and also not helpful, to
pretend that the only really relevant issue in this litigation is
not before us. In any event, if one erroneously chooses, as the
Court does, to make adjudicative jurisdiction (or, more
precisely, abstention) the vehicle for taking account of the
needs of prescriptive comity, the Court still gets it wrong.67
Justice Scalia’s critique of the varieties of jurisdiction and
extraterritoriality did not languish. In subsequent cases, the Supreme
Court went on to use the basic analytical framework in Scalia’s
Hartford Fire dissent to reconsider how courts determine subject-

64

Id. at 817-18.
Id. at 818 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 403 (1987) [hereinafter Restatement (Third)].
66
Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 819.
67
Id. at 820. The term “prescriptive comity” stands for the presumptive
territorial limitation international law places on laws enacted by Congress. For
Justice Scalia, the proper focus of the comity analysis is on this form of prescriptive
comity, not adjudicative comity where a court declines to exercise jurisdiction.
65
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matter jurisdiction and the extent of Congress’s prescriptive
jurisdiction to enact laws regulating extraterritorial conduct.
B. Taking the FTAIA Head On: F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran
S.A.
For this Note’s narrative arc, Justice Scalia’s dissent in Hartford
Fire serves as the point of embarkation for the journey to the Seventh
Circuit’s en banc decision in Minn-Chem v. Agrium. However, the way
there requires a few more stops at the Supreme Court.68 In 2004 the
Supreme Court directly addressed the relationship between
prescriptive comity and the FTAIA in F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v.
Empagran S.A.69 The case itself has a complicated history and requires
a brief narrative. The original plaintiffs, both domestic and foreign
purchasers of vitamin supplements, alleged that foreign and domestic
manufacturers and distributors had violated the Sherman Act by
entering into a price-fixing conspiracy that raised prices for consumers
in the United States and in foreign countries.70 The defendant
companies argued that the FTAIA precluded the district court from
hearing the case solely as it pertained to foreign plaintiffs because the
alleged antitrust violation occurred in the course of foreign
commerce.71 The district court agreed with the defendants and
dismissed that part of the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.72
On appeal to the District of Columbia Circuit, the foreign
plaintiffs, now severed from the domestic plaintiffs, argued that the
68

See Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416 (1996) (Ginsburg, J. concurring);
Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998); Kontrick v. Ryan,
540 U.S. 443 (2004); Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401 (2004); Bowles v.
Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007); Union Pacific R. Co. v. Locomotive Eng’rs, 558 U.S.
67; Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki 131 S.Ct. 1197 (2011).
69
F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 158-59 (2004)
[hereinafter Empagran II].
70
Empagran S.A. v. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 342 (D.C. Cir.
2003), rev’d, 542 U.S 155 (2004) [hereinafter Empagran I].
71
Id.
72
Id.
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language of the FTAIA, specifically the phrase “gives rise to a claim”
in § 6a(2) of the FTAIA, permitted a federal district court to exercise
jurisdiction over their claims.73 The court agreed with the foreign
plaintiffs, holding that the act permitted a foreign plaintiff’s claim so
long as the alleged injurious conduct has “requisite effect on United
States commerce.”74 The court’s holding may be stated in a slightly
more formulaic way: when a) anticompetitive conduct violates the
Sherman Act; and b) produces a harmful effect on United States
commerce; and c) the effect gives rise to a claim; then d) the FTAIA
does not bar a foreign plaintiff from bringing suit in federal district
court based on the anticompetitive conduct’s independent effect on
foreign commerce.75 The court argued that this expansive
interpretation of the FTAIA conformed to the structure of the Act
itself,76 the legislative intent behind the Act,77 and the policy goal of
deterring international price-fixing cartels.78
The Supreme Court reversed.79 At the Court, the plaintiffs argued
that the FTAIA prevented the Sherman Act’s application to United
States export commerce.80 Under their interpretation, the Sherman Act
still applied to antitrust conduct occurring in either import commerce
or wholly foreign commerce.81 Therefore, because the plaintiffs’
claims arose from wholly foreign transactions, the FTAIA did not limit
the application of the Sherman Act.82
But the FTAIA restriction is not that narrow. Justice Breyer,
writing for the Court, explained that the FTAIA barred antitrust claims
73

Id. at 348-49.
Id. at 350.
75
Id.
76
Empagran I, 315 F.3d at 350-52.
77
Id. at 352-55.
78
Id. at 355-57.
79
F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. (Empagran II), 542 U.S. 155,
175 (2004).
80
Id. at 162.
81
Id.
82
Id.
74
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arising from United States export commerce, as the plaintiffs had
argued, as well as those claims arising from wholly foreign
transactions.83 This conclusion not only had clear support in the
legislative history,84 but it also conformed to the rule of statutory
construction requiring the Court to interpret “ambiguous statutes to
avoid an unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of
other nations.”85 The Court found that the chief harm potentially
resulting from the lower court’s interpretation would be an improper
application of an American law in conflict with considerations
required by the principle of international comity.86
Whether the FTAIA limited a federal court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction was not an issue before the Court in Empagran. However,
the Court recognized that the foreign plaintiffs were attempting to
expand the reach of American law beyond the limit of Congress’s

83

Id. at 163. For example, consider an international price-fixing cartel of
widget manufacturers. The manufacturers are located all over the world except the
United States. They sell their widgets in every country. The price-fixing conspiracy
causes an antitrust injury to a widget-purchaser in the United States because the
conspiracy violates § 1 of the Sherman Act. The transaction occurs in the course of
U.S. import commerce. The FTAIA, therefore, does not bar a U.S. widget-purchaser
from bringing an antitrust lawsuit to a federal district court. Now, consider a resident
of Chile who purchases a widget from a manufacturer participating in the cartel. The
FTAIA, especially after Empagran II, bars the Chilean purchaser from pursuing an
antitrust lawsuit in U.S. federal court, either alone or along with the U.S. purchaser,
because the Chilean purchaser’s injury occurred in wholly-foreign commerce,
independent of the effect the conspiracy had in the United States.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 164.
86
Id. at 169 (“We conclude that principles of prescriptive comity counsel
against the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the FTAIA. Where foreign
anticompetitive conduct plays a significant role and where foreign injury is
independent of domestic effects, Congress might have hoped that America’s antitrust
laws, so fundamental a component of our own economic system, would commend
themselves to other nations as well. But, if America’s antitrust policies could not win
their own way in the international marketplace for such ideas, Congress, we must
assume, would not have tried to impose them, in an act of legal imperialism, through
legislative fiat.”).
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prescriptive jurisdiction.87 Based on this analysis, the Court concluded
that the FTAIA barred the foreign plaintiffs’ cause of action.88 This
development is notable because Justice Breyer’s form of analysis
echoed Justice Scalia’s position in his Hartford Fire dissent, which
argued that statutory interpretation is the proper form of inquiry for an
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act.89 The Court’s method
of reasoning in Empagran represented the most significant change in
the Court’s thinking about the FTAIA after Hartford Fire. In a sense,
the seeds planted in Justice Scalia’s Hartford Fire dissent had started
to sprout.
C. Delineating Subject-Matter Jurisdiction and Merits: Arbaugh v.
Y&H Corporation
In its 2006 decision, Arbaugh v. Y&H Corporation, the Court, in a
unanimous opinion penned by Justice Ginsburg, adopted a bright line
test for determining whether a statute grants a federal court subjectmatter jurisdiction.90 This decision arose from a sexual harassment suit
brought under Title VII.91 The case went to a jury trial in district court,
where Arbaugh won and was awarded $40,000 in damages.92 Two
weeks after the trial court entered judgment on the jury verdict, the
defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on the premise that the court
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.93 The defendant argued that the
court’s jurisdiction over the Title VII claim hinged on the statute’s
definition of “employer.”94 For the purpose of the statute, an employer
is defined as a person engaged in commerce having fifteen or more
87

Id. at 165-66.
Id.
89
Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817-18; see
discussion supra Part II. A.
90
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corporation, 546 U.S. 500, 515 (2006).
91
Id. at 503-04.
92
Id. at 504.
93
Id.
94
Id.
88
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employees.95 Under this reading of the statute, Y&H claimed that
because it had fewer than fifteen employees, the district court had no
jurisdiction over the Title VII claim. The district court granted the
defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.96
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.97
At the Supreme Court, the issue in Arbaugh was “whether Title
VII’s employee-numerosity requirement . . . is jurisdictional or simply
an element of a plaintiff’s claim for relief.”98 The consequence of
classifying the fifteen-employee requirement as jurisdictional would
require setting aside the judgment entered on the jury verdict for the
plaintiff.99 Alternatively, if the lower courts should have found that the
requirement concerned the merits of the plaintiff’s case, then the
defendant raised the issue too late to warrant setting aside the trial
court’s judgment.100
The Court held that the fifteen-employee requirement should not
be construed as jurisdictional.101 Under the Court’s analysis, a district
court’s jurisdiction comes from either constitutional or statutory grants
of subject-matter jurisdiction.102 However, the grant of subject-matter
jurisdiction does not categorically preclude a “numerical” threshold
requirement.103 For example, the Court found that the “minimum
amount in controversy” required as a prerequisite for diversity
jurisdiction104 is properly characterized as a jurisdictional matter.105
95

Id. at 504 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(b) (2006)).
Id.
97
Id. at 509.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 510.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 516.
102
Id. at 513. (“The basic statutory grants of federal-court subject-matter
jurisdiction are contained in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Section 1331 provides for
‘[f]ederal-question’ jurisdiction, § 1332 for ‘[d]iversity of citizenship’
jurisdiction.”); see also, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
103
Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515.
104
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006).
105
Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514-15.
96
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However, the difference between the minimum amount-in-controversy
requirement and the fifteen-employee requirement under Title VII was
their respective locations within the statutes.106 On the one hand, the
amount-in-controversy minimum is within a portion of the United
States Code that explicitly vests jurisdiction in the federal courts over
cases involving diversity of citizenship.107 On the other hand, the
fifteen-employee requirement lies in Title VII’s definitions section,108
which is completely separate from the jurisdictional grant in Title
VII.109 Congress could amend Title VII to attach the fifteen-employee
requirement to the jurisdictional grant, but until that happens the Court
would hold that the numerical requirement fell squarely within the
merits of the case.110
After observing that, “this Court and others have been less than
meticulous” when separating subject-matter jurisdiction from the
elements of a claim for relief,111 Justice Ginsburg went on to state the
new legal rule:
If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a
statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional, then courts and
litigants will be duly instructed and will not be left to wrestle
with the issue. . . . But when Congress does not rank a
statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts
should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.112
This rule is general, in that it does not concern Title VII alone, but
rather it creates a signal for federal courts on how to interpret
106

Id. at 515.
Id.
108
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006).
109
Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(5) (2006) (“Each
United States district court and each United States court of a place subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this
subchapter.”).
110
Id. at 515.
111
Id. at 511.
112
Id. at 515-16.
107
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statutes.113 For the courts, the rule requires an inquiry into whether a
jurisdictional grant is expressly stated in a statute’s text. If the court
finds such language, then the issue impacted by the statute is
jurisdictional.114 Where no jurisdictional language is present, the
statutory requirements automatically speak to the merits of a claim.115
Meanwhile, for Congress, the rule provides guidance on how to
write statutes.116 When Congress intends for a threshold requirement
to determine whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction, then the
text establishing that requirement should accompany the explicit grant
of subject-matter jurisdiction.117 Otherwise, Arbaugh gives Congress
notice that courts will construe a statutory requirement as an element
necessary to establish a cause of action.118
D. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, Merits, and Extraterritoriality:
Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.
Justice Scalia’s 2010 majority opinion in Morrison v. National
Australia Bank Ltd. revisits the issues discussed in Hartford Fire,
except that, instead of the FTAIA, the statutory provision at issue was
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.119 The plaintiffs, all Australian
residents, were shareholders of National Australia Bank

113

See, e.g., Wasserman, supra note 37, at 953.
Id.
115
Id.; compare Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83,
90 (1998) (holding that a statute’s explicit reference to “jurisdiction” did not affect
the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, but rather remained an element of the cause of
action).
116
See Wasserman, supra note 37, at 953.
117
Id. at 954.
118
Id.
119
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (2006) (original
version at ch. 404, Title I, § 10, 48 Stat. 891 (1934)) (amended 2000). The version
of the statute codified in 2000 was at issue in Morrison. This section was amended
again in the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, but that amended version was not at issue in
this case.
114
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(“National”).120 They alleged that management executives of the bank
had made false public statements in reference to a Florida-based
subsidiary wholly owned by the bank.121 National also had other
contacts with the United States through American Depository Receipts
(“ADRs”) traded on the New York Stock Exchange.122 The plaintiffs
filed suit against National and its management alleging violations of
§§ 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and S.E.C. Rule
10b-5.123 The defendants moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6).124 The district court dismissed the case on the grounds that it
lacked jurisdiction “because the acts in this country ‘were, at most, a
link in the chain of an alleged overall securities fraud scheme that
culminated abroad.’”125 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed on similar grounds.126
Justice Scalia, now writing for the majority, found the same error
he identified in Hartford Fire in the district and appellate courts’
decisions.127 Essentially, the lower courts treated a statute that
regulates conduct as a statute that grants subject-matter jurisdiction to
the courts.128 Subject-matter jurisdiction did not spring from § 10(b).
Rather, the specific statutory provision that grants subject-matter

120

Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 130 S.Ct. 2869, 2876 (2010).
Id.
122
Id. at 2875.
123
Id. at 2876 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78t(a), and 17 CFR § 240.10b-5
(2009)).
124
Morrison, 130 S.Ct. at 2876.
125
Id. (quoting In re National Australia Bank Securities Litigation, 2006 WL
3844465, *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2006)).
126
Id.
127
Id. at 2876-77.
128
Id. at 2877 (“But to ask what conduct § 10(b) reaches is to ask what
conduct § 10(b) prohibits, which is a merits question. Subject-matter jurisdiction, by
contrast, ‘refers to a tribunal’s “ ‘power to hear a case.’”) (quoting Union Pacific R.
Co. v. Locomotive Eng’rs, 558 U.S. 67, 130 (2009), in turn quoting Arbaugh v.
Y&H Corporation, 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006), in turn quoting United States v.
Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002)).
121
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jurisdiction over a § 10(b) claim is 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.129 After
concluding that § 10(b) was not jurisdictional, Scalia then considered
whether the statute applies to extraterritorial conduct.130
The opinion then follows with a discourse on the presumption
against extraterritoriality in causes of action arising under § 10(b).131
Justice Scalia noted that, until 1967, the presumption consistently led
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals to conclude that § 10(b) did not
apply to stock transactions occurring in a foreign country.132
However, in two decisions - Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook133 and
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell134 - the Second
Circuit formulated a two-prong test that, if satisfied, permitted
129

Id. As part of the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress amended § 78aa in response to
the Court’s decision in Morrison. As it reads, the amendment granted subject-matter
jurisdiction to United States courts over cases, including those filed by foreign
plaintiffs, involving extraterritorial conduct that has a foreseeable substantial effect
in the United States. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (2010), Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1865 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(1934)). Although, Congress passed the amendment intending to have § 10(b) apply
extraterritorially, a literal reading of the statute might not change the subject-matter
jurisdiction holding in Morrison, which states that the court already had jurisdiction
over § 10(b) causes of action. Thus the amendment, in what may be a drafting error,
reiterates the subject-matter jurisdiction holding in Morrison, leaving open the
possibility that the presumption against extraterritoriality may still apply to § 10(b).
In short, the possibility remains that courts still have jurisdiction – i.e., power to
adjudicate – a § 10(b) case, but that does not necessarily imply that the law applies to
conduct occurring in foreign countries. For a more thorough discussion of this
peculiar situation, see Richard Painter, Douglas Dunham, & Ellen Quackenbos,
When Courts and Congress Don’t Say What They Mean: Initial Reactions to
Morrison v. National Australia National Bank and the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 20 MINN. J. INT’L. 1, 14-25 (2011).
130
Id. at 2877-78.
131
Id. at 2877
132
Id. (citing Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F.Supp. 385, 392 (1967), in turn
citing Ferraoli v. Cantor, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 91615 (SDNY 1965) and Kook v
Crang, 182 F.Supp. 388, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)).
133
Schoenbaum, 268 F.Supp. at 206-09.
134
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334-37
(1972).
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extraterritorial application of § 10(b).135 Under the Schoenbaum test, a
court first had to ask whether the alleged violative conduct had a
“substantial effect” in the United States or upon United States
citizens.136 Leasco solidified the second prong, whether the alleged
conduct occurred within the United States.137 After cataloging a series
of circuit splits and commentaries critical of this test,138 Justice Scalia
concluded that this test was invalid because courts should interpret
congressional silence on extraterritoriality as automatically prohibiting
extraterritorial application.139 “Rather than guess anew in each case,”
wrote Justice Scalia, “we apply the presumption in all cases,
preserving a stable background against which Congress can legislate
with predictable effects.”140 Thus ended the inquiry into whether §
10(b) applied extraterritorially.
The petitioners nonetheless argued that the presumption against
extraterritoriality did not bar their claim because the deceptive conduct
at issue occurred in Florida.141 This fact was of little consequence to
the Court, however. Under Justice Scalia’s interpretation of the
statute, a violation of § 10(b) requires deceptive conduct “in
connection” with a purchase or sale of securities within the United
States.142 He grounded this “transactional” test on two premises. First,
transactions within the United States involving either domestic
securities or exchanges fall under § 10(b)’s regulatory purview.143
Second, §§ 30(a) and (b) of the Securities Exchange Act regulate
transactions occurring within the United States involving securities
registered on foreign exchanges.144 These premises fall in line with the
135

Morrison, 130 S.Ct. at 2879.
Id.
137
Id. (citing SEC v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 192-93 (2d Cir. 2003)).
138
Id. at 2879-81.
139
Id. at 2881.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 2883-84.
142
Id. at 2884.
143
Id. at 2884-85.
144
Id. at 2885.
136
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presumption against extraterritoriality because “the foreign location of
the transaction . . . establishes (or reflects the presumption of) the
Act’s inapplicability, absent regulations by the [Securities Exchange]
Commission.”145 The final virtue of this test, and the presumption
against extraterritoriality, is that it prevents conflicts and interference
with foreign laws and securities regulators.146
III. JURISDICTION, EXTRATERRITORIALITY, AND ANTITRUST AT THE
SEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
Having established the backdrop, the stage is now set for MinnChem v. Agrium. Like the Supreme Court’s march from Hartford Fire
to Morrison, the Seventh Circuit’s journey began in the muddled
milieu of what did or did not define a federal court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction. In United Phosphorus Ltd. v Angus Chemical Company,
its first decision interpreting the FTAIA, a divided Seventh Circuit
sitting en banc held that the FTAIA proscribed a district court’s subject
matter jurisdiction.147 However, Judge Wood’s dissent148 in that case
eventually served as the template for the unanimous decision that
reversed the United Phosphorus holding, Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium
Inc.149 This section tells the story of these two cases.
A. Enter, United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chemical Company
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit first
encountered the FTAIA in United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chemical
Company.150 The plaintiffs were an American firm and two chemical
manufacturers based in India, all three of whom participated in a joint
145

Id.
Id. at 2885-86.
147
United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co. (United Phosphorus II), 322
F.3d 942 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1003 (2003).
148
Id. at 953-65.
149
Minn-Chem v. Agrium, 683 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
150
United Phosphorus II, 322 F.3d at 944.
146
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venture to manufacture certain chemicals used in making
pharmaceuticals for the treatment of tuberculosis.151 The defendants
included: Angus Chemical Company (“Angus”), a Delaware
Corporation; its wholly-owned German subsidiary, Angus Chemie
GmbH; and Lupin Laboratories, Ltd., an Indian chemical company.152
The plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that the “[d]efendants attempted to
monopolize, monopolized, and conspired to monopolize the market for
those chemicals in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act.”153
The plaintiffs argued that the § 2 violations occurred in the mid1990s as a consequence of prior litigation Angus had initiated in the
Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, to enjoin the American member
of the joint venture from misappropriating its trade secrets.154 Two
years into the litigation, when the Circuit Court issued a discovery
ruling that required Angus to disclose the very trade secrets it had sued
to protect, Angus voluntarily withdrew its complaint.155 According to
the plaintiffs’ complaint, “but for Angus’s initiation of the Cook
County Action,” the Indian co-plaintiffs would have sold the
pharmaceutical chemicals for a profit.156 Also, but for Angus’s
complaint, the American co-plaintiff would have sold the
manufacturing technology.157 In a second amended complaint, the
Indian plaintiffs argued that the defendants used anti-competitive
means to restrain them from manufacturing the chemicals.158
The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction.159 The district court held that the FTAIA
barred the plaintiffs’ complaint largely because any anticompetitive
151

United Phosphorus v. Angus Chem. (United Phosphorus I), 131 F.Supp.2d
1003, 1006-08 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
152
Id. at 1006.
153
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 2).
154
Id. at 1007.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id. at 1008.
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conduct would not have had a “demonstrable effect” on United States
domestic commerce.160 The plaintiffs appealed to the Seventh Circuit,
echoing the arguments Justice Scalia made in his Hartford Fire
dissent.161 On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the district court erred
in granting the motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
because the FTAIA does not affect jurisdiction, but rather it only adds
an element to the Sherman Act claim.162
1. The Majority Opinion
Despite an evenly divided court, the Seventh Circuit sitting en
banc affirmed the lower court’s ruling.163 The rationale adopted by the
majority took direct aim at Justice Scalia’s dissent in Hartford Fire.164
Judge Evans, writing for the majority, drew the inference that the
FTAIA confers subject-matter jurisdiction from the footnotes in Justice
Souter’s majority opinion in Hartford Fire.165 Because the tendency of
other circuits had been to classify the FTAIA as “jurisdictional,” the
majority argued that its interpretation followed the prevailing view.166
160

Id. at 1012 (“It is clear that Plaintiffs cannot carry their burden of showing a
‘direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect’ on domestic commerce under
the FTAIA. A Plaintiffs’ own liability expert agreed, ‘any effect upon United States
commerce, based on what [he has] seen with respect to AB sales’ would be ‘less
than substantial.’”).
161
United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co. (United Phosphorus II), 322
F.3d 942, 946 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
162
Id. at 944.
163
Id. at 952; see also, e.g., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir.
Practitioner’s Handbook for Appeals 141 (2012), http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/
rules/handbook.pdf (“Thus, if the court en banc should be equally divided, the
judgment of the district court and not the judgment of the panel will be affirmed.”).
164
United Phosphorus II, 322 F.3d at 947-48. For discussion on Justice
Scalia’s dissent in Hartford Fire, see discussion supra Part II.A.
165
Id. (citing Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 796 n. 22, 797 n. 24).
166
Id. at 950-51. Referring to decisions made by the District of Columbia and
Fifth Circuit Courts ruling on subject-matter jurisdiction and the FTAIA, Judge
Evans states, “We simply cannot dismiss these cases as ‘drive-by’ jurisdictional
rulings.”
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Furthermore, legal commentators, the American Bar Association, and
the government’s enforcement agencies also supported this
classification.167 The court also found that the FTAIA’s legislative
history lends itself to the court’s holding that the FTAIA is
jurisdictional.168 Finally, as a matter of policy, because an
extraterritorial application of United States antitrust law could have
consequences on the conduct of United States foreign affairs and on
foreign markets, classifying the FTAIA as jurisdictional permits a
judge to dismiss a cause of action at an earlier stage than would be
available were the FTAIA’s statutory requirements treated solely as an
element of the cause of action.169
2. The Dissent
In her dissent, Judge Wood couched the issue of whether the
FTAIA is jurisdictional or instead lays out an element of the cause of
action as a question pertaining to whether the FTAIA strips federal
district courts of their subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§
1331 and 1337.170 If the FTAIA’s requirement for “substantial, direct,
and reasonably foreseeable effect” on United States commerce strips
the applicability of those statutory sections to the Sherman Act, then
the FTAIA limits a federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.171 If,
however, the FTAIA states an element of a Sherman Act cause of
action, then subject-matter jurisdiction should not have entered into
the district court’s analysis of whether there is a required effect on
United States commerce.172
167

Id. at 949.
Id. at 951-52. (“The House Report says that satisfying FTAIA would be
‘the predicate for antitrust jurisdiction.’ It also says, ‘[t]his bill only establishes the
standards necessary for assertion of United States Antitrust jurisdiction. The
substantive antitrust issues on the merits of the plaintiffs’ claim would remain
unchanged.’”) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 97-686 at 11).
169
Id. at 952.
170
Id. at 953 (Wood, J., dissenting).
171
Id.
172
Id.
168
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In an argument that foreshadows her en banc opinion in MinnChem, Judge Wood gave four reasons for adopting an “element
approach” instead of the majority’s interpretation that the FTAIA goes
to a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.173 First, the text of the FTAIA
itself does not contain language suggesting that Congress altered the
jurisdiction of federal courts over antitrust cases.174 Although the
Supreme Court had treated some statutes containing jurisdictional
language as “non-jurisdictional,”175 the Court had never treated a
statute “phrased in terms of the scope of application of a statute” as
jurisdictional.176 By way of comparison, Judge Wood argued that
Congress has enacted statutes that explicitly restrict federal court
jurisdiction.177 The FTAIA simply does not bear any textual
resemblance to those jurisdiction-stripping statutes.178 It does not even
contain the word “jurisdiction.”179
Judge Wood considered this first textual argument enough to
justify holding that the FTAIA presents an element of a cause of
action; however, she continued by disputing the majority’s claim that
Hartford Fire controlled the outcome in United Phosphorus.180 Judge
Wood argued instead that the majority in Hartford Fire in fact found it
unnecessary to address whether the FTAIA had any effect on the
173

Id. at 953-54.
Id. at 954-955.
175
Id. at 954; see also, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523
U.S. 83, 90-2 (1998).
176
United Phosphorus II, 322 F.3d at 954.
177
Id. Judge Wood refers to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(B) and 1255, which bar
judicial review of certain immigration decisions. Section 1252(a)(2)(B), in relevant
part, states that “notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have
jurisdiction to review . . . any judgment regarding the granting of relief under”
section 1255.
178
Id. at 955. (“Language like that of the FTAIA, stating that a law does not
‘apply’ in certain circumstances, cannot be equated to language stating that the
courts do not have fundamental competence to consider defined categories of
cases.”).
179
See discussion supra Part I. B. 2.
180
United Phosphorus II, 322 F.3d at 956.
174
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outcome of that case.181 In other words, the majority’s reliance on
Hartford Fire was misplaced because there was no holding on point
from that case.182 Instead, holding that the FTAIA presents an element
of a cause of action better aligns the FTAIA with the Supreme Court’s
more recent decision in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Environment.183
In Steel Co. the Court underscored the distinction between statutes
establishing subject-matter jurisdiction and those laying out the
elements of a cause of action: “the power to adjudicate does not
depend whether in the final analysis the plaintiff has a valid claim.”184
Without a reference to “jurisdiction” in the FTAIA, the court should
have concluded, based on the holding in Steel Co., that Congress
intended to define an element to a cause of action.185 Thus the FTAIA
permits recovery only if the plaintiffs can show the requisite effect in
their case.186 Without showing the effect, the plaintiffs lose the cause
of action; the “required effect” simply has no effect on jurisdiction.187
The third reason countered the majority’s claim that, for policy
reasons, it is better to characterize the FTAIA as conferring subjectmatter jurisdiction.188 Judge Wood contended that jurisdictional
inquiries under §§ 1331 and 1332 at the outset of a case normally
follow a routine review based on the facts alleged in the complaint;189
however, whether there is a “direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect” on United States commerce always requires a more
thorough inquiry.190 An inquiry into subject-matter jurisdiction could
181

Id.
Id.
183
Id. at 955.
184
Id. (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 8990 (1998).
185
Id.
186
Id. at 956.
187
Id.
188
Id. at 956.
189
Id. at 957.
190
Id.
182
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turn into a “preliminary trial” just to determine whether the required
effect is present.191 Instead, treating the FTAIA effect test as an
element of the case permits resolving the issue on the pleadings, on
summary judgment, or at the appellate level de novo.192 Keeping the
FTAIA within the realm of subject-matter jurisdiction, however, would
invite abuse from losing parties who would continue to have the
ability to move for dismissal under 12(b)(1) before, during, and after
the completion of the case, thus leaving the possibility that the court
could re-initiate at any time an inquiry into whether the effect test had
been met.193
Finally, Judge Wood argued that the history of the application of
the antitrust laws to persons and conduct outside of the United States
supports the conclusion that the FTAIA does not affect a district
court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.194 Referring to both American
Banana Company v. United Fruit Co. and United States v. Aluminum
Corporation of America (Alcoa), Judge Wood observed that the
Supreme Court in the former, and the Second Circuit in the latter,
spoke about extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act in terms of
whether the law itself extended to parties and conduct abroad.195
Neither court questioned whether it, or the courts below, had
adjudicatory power over the Sherman Act claims.196 Furthermore, the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
addressed the jurisdictional dilemma presented to the Seventh
191

Id. Judge Wood provides the twelve-year litigation in Timberlane Lumber
Co. v. Bank of America N.T., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976) (reversing district court
dismissal for lack of subject- matter jurisdiction), 574 F.Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1983)
(dismissing for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction), aff’d on other grounds, 749 F.2d
1378 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985), as an example of this
jurisdictional inquiry run amok.
192
Id. at 957.
193
Id. at 958.
194
Id. at 959.
195
Id. at 959-61 (citing American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S.
347 (1909); United States v. Aluminum Co. Of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416
(1945)).
196
Id.
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Circuit.197 The Restatement rejects the use of the phrase “subjectmatter jurisdiction” to describe the forms of jurisdiction recognized
under international law.198 Instead, it recognized the concept of
“prescriptive” jurisdiction as describing the power of the legislature to
enact laws that regulate conduct beyond a country’s borders.199
B. Exit United Phosphorus, Chased by Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc.
And so an idea that began in a dissent in Hartford Fire, and then
returned only to face rejection in United Phosphorus, returned
triumphant in Minn-Chem. This section concludes the story of the
litigation that led to the Seventh Circuit’s en banc decision in MinnChem.
1. The Antitrust Case
Potash is a potassium-rich mineral and chemical salt, chiefly
extracted for use in fertilizer, but also used as an ingredient in
industrial manufacturing for glass, ceramics, soaps, and animal feed.200
The product is homogenous, meaning that potash supplied by one
producer is indistinguishable from another producer’s supply.201 Thus,
buyers base purchasing decisions almost entirely on price alone.202
Direct and indirect purchasers of potash in the United States brought
class action lawsuits in the federal district courts of Minnesota and the
Northern District of Illinois against domestic and foreign potash
producers.203 At the end of 2008, the lawsuits were combined and
197

Id. at 961-62.
Id. at 961 (citing Restatement (Third), supra note 65, § 401, cmt. c).
199
Id. (citing Restatement (Third), supra note 65, § 401 cmt. c).
200
In re Potash Antitrust Litigation, 667 F.Supp.2d 907, 915 (2009).
201
Id.
202
Id.
203
Id. at 919. The six producers were Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan
(Canada) Inc. and its U.S. subsidiary Potash Sales (USA), Inc.; Mosaic Company
and Mosaic Crop Nutrition, a Delaware company headquartered in Minnesota;
Agrium Inc. and Agrium U.S. Inc., a Canadian corporation and its wholly-owned
198
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assigned to the Northern District of Illinois.204 The plaintiffs’ chief
allegation was that the producers had engaged in a horizontal pricefixing conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act.205
To meet the pleading threshold set by the Supreme Court’s
decision in Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly,206 the plaintiffs’
complaint alleged that these producers formed a price-fixing cartel,
which, since 2003, had been responsible for a 600% increase in the
price of potash.207 The six firms accused of participating in the
international cartel were located in Canada, Russia, and Belarus.208
Each firm had affiliates (either wholly-owned subsidiaries or jointventures) operating in the United States.209 In 2008, these firms were

U.S. subsidiary; Uralkali, a Russian joint venture headquartered in Moscow;
Belaruskali, a Belarusian company, which together with Uralkali owned JSC
Belarusian Potash Company, which acts as the distributor for Uralkali and
Belaruskali; Silvinit, a Russian company that sells potash globally and in the United
States; and IPC, a Russian company that is Silvinit’s exclusive distributor.
204
Id.
205
Id. at 919. The plaintiffs classified as “indirect purchasers” included in
their complaint four other counts alleging that the defendants violated twenty-one
state antitrust laws, twenty-three state consumer protection laws, fifty state law
claims of unjust enrichment, and a restraint of trade claim under New York law. The
state law claims were not at issue in the Seventh Circuit’s en banc proceedings.
Furthermore, as a matter of federal antitrust law, the indirect purchasers were not
entitled to seek damages. See Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 848
(7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (citing Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 792
(1977).
206
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). Twombly
requires the pleadings in a civil antitrust complaint to allege enough facts to state
plausible grounds for a cause of action. Mere conclusory statements, without more,
are not enough to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). In Ashcroft v.
Iqbal (556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)) the Supreme Court expanded the Twombly
pleading requirements to all civil actions in federal law. In this Note, Twombly is
used as shorthand for the pleading requirements established by both cases. See also,
e.g., 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1216 (3d ed.
2013).
207
Potash, 667 F.Supp.2d at 915.
208
Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d at 648-49.
209
Id.
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responsible for over 71% of the world’s potash production.210 By
2008, when demand for potash started to decline, prices remained high
and continued to increase while other fertilizer prices declined.211
Meanwhile, potash supply is relatively easy to manipulate, in part
because there are no ready, cost-effective substitutes;212 purchasers
tend to buy at the higher price rather than curtail the volume of their
orders;213 production companies have variable costs and have little
incentive to operate facilities at full capacity;214 and entry-barriers into
the market are high, with new mines requiring an up-front expense of
approximately $2.5 billion.215 In 2008, imports accounted for over
85% of U.S. potash consumption.216 The United States is one of the
two largest consumers of potash.217
The alleged cartel arose in the early 2000s, after a period of
significant price depression during the 1990s, when post-Soviet
producers released a glut of potash onto global markets.218 Beginning
in mid-2003, potash prices began to rise.219 According to the plaintiffs’
complaint, the conspiracy worked through a series of coordinated
supply restrictions that the producers blamed for price increases.220
Rather than fix specific prices for the American market, the producers
raised prices on potash sales to China, India, and Brazil.221 The prices
charged to purchasers in those three countries served as the benchmark

210

Potash, 667 F.Supp.2d at 915
Id.
212
Id.
213
Id.
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 858 (7th Cir. 2012).
217
Id. at 849.
218
Potash, 667 F.Supp.2d at 915.
219
Id.
220
Id. at 916-17.
221
Id. at 915.
211
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for potash prices charged elsewhere in the world, including the United
States.222
The plaintiffs also pointed to connections between the potash
producers.223 Three of the producers in the western hemisphere were
co-venturers and equal shareowners of Canpotex, Ltd., a Canadian
corporation that sold potash throughout the world, except in the United
States and Canada.224 Two potash producers located in the former
Soviet Union also formed a joint-venture company to consolidate their
sales and marketing for global sales.225 Further coordination among
the defendants occurred through business meetings and conferences
where representatives of the producers could meet and discuss future
price movements.226 Under these alleged facts, the plaintiffs accused
the defendants of violating the Sherman Act, violating various States’
antitrust and consumer protection laws, and unjust enrichment.227
2. The District Court Decision and Interlocutory Appeal to the Seventh
Circuit
In district court, the Defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’
complaint based on a variety of facial and procedural challenges.228
The focus in this discussion, however, is on the defendants’ motion to
dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The defendants based
222

Id.
Id. at 917-19.
224
Id. at 917.
225
Id.
226
Id. at 919.
227
Id.
228
See Id. at 920-24 (class certification and Article III standing), 928-32
(Insufficient Service), 941-46 (State antitrust), 946-48 (State consumer protection),
948-49 (State unjust enrichment). The defendants filed motions to dismiss arguing,
inter alia, that class certification, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23, was improper; the Indirect
Purchasers lacked Article III standing for claims brought under the laws of States
where no named plaintiff resided; the Russian defendants had insufficient service of
process (under Rules 12(b)(4) and 12(b)(5)); the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead
State antitrust, consumer protection, and unjust enrichment claims.
223
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their motion to dismiss on the premise that the FTAIA excluded the
foreign price-fixing conspiracy from the court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction. According to the motion, the plaintiffs’ complaint failed
to allege that the foreign antitrust conduct had a “direct, substantial,
and foreseeable effect” (“direct effect test”) on United States
commerce.229 More specifically, whatever effect the alleged conduct
had on American commerce was “too attenuated” to be deemed
“direct.”230 The defendants argued that, without this “direct” effect, the
district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.231
The district court reviewed the motion under the rubric
established in United Phosphorus, and held that the FTAIA stripped
federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over foreign antitrust
conduct.232 For the court, the issue turned not on whether there was a
direct effect, but rather whether the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged
facts that showed the antitrust conduct fell under the FTAIA’s import
commerce exception.233 The court concluded that a sufficient “nexus”
existed between the alleged foreign conspiracy and the fact that the
defendants “sold and distributed potash throughout the United States”
so that the plaintiffs’ complaint fell under the import commerce
exception.234 Because the complaint met the import exception, the
court did not need to take up the direct effect test. Therefore, under the
“jurisdictional” analysis (as opposed to one on the “merits”), the
plaintiffs met the minimum threshold requirements to survive the
motion to dismiss.235

229

Potash, 667 F.Supp.2d at 926.
Id.
231
Id.
232
Id. at 925.
233
Id. at 926. Recall that the FTAIA exception for import commerce means
that the Sherman Act continues to regulate conduct occurring in import commerce.
234
Id. at 927.
235
Id.
230
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The district court certified its order for immediate review in an
interlocutory appeal to the Seventh Circuit.236 The three-judge panel
(“Panel”) reversed the lower court’s order, holding that the FTAIA
barred the complaint because the court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction. At this stage of the litigation, the plaintiffs argued that the
Panel should call United Phosphorus into question and instead subject
the FTAIA to the rule expressed by the Supreme Court in Arbaugh.237
In response, the defendants gave two arguments as grounds for
reversal. First, the FTAIA is distinguishable from Arbaugh because
the FTAIA’s primary concern is international comity.238 The Panel
found that following this interpretation would put the court’s decision
in tension with the holding in Morrison.239
Second, the defendants stated that there was no need for the Panel
to reconcile the holding in United Phosphorus with Arbaugh because
dismissal was required under both cases .240 The Panel agreed.241 In its
analysis, the Panel gave a twofold critique of the lower court’s
interpretation of the FTAIA.242 First, the Panel found that, under the
district court’s interpretation, the direct effect test becomes
superfluous.243 Under the lower court’s reasoning, any importer of a
product into the United States who happens also to engage in a pricefixing conspiracy aimed at a foreign country would be subject to
antitrust suits in the United States.244 The Panel claimed that this
236

Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 657 F.3d 650, 652 (7th Cir. 2011),
vacated, 683 F.3d. 845 (2012) (en banc) [hereinafter Minn-Chem I]. See 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b) (2006). A district court judge has the authority to grant a right to
immediately appeal an order when the judge is of the opinion that the order concerns
a controlling question of law that is likely to engender a substantial difference of
opinion.
237
Minn-Chem I. at 659. See discussion supra Part II.C.
238
Id.
239
Id.
240
Id.
241
Id.
242
Id. at 660-63.
243
Id. at 660.
244
Id. at 660-61.
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interpretation went beyond Congress’s intent to limit extraterritorial
applications of antitrust law through the FTAIA.245 According to the
Panel, the better interpretation would not conflate the import exception
with the direct effect test, but instead it would require the direct effect
test to apply specifically to the conduct aimed at foreign countries.246
If the foreign-directed conduct created a “direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect” on United States import or interstate
commerce, then the court would have subject-matter jurisdiction.247
Next the Panel applied a Twombly analysis to the facts alleged by
the plaintiffs to determine whether the litigation could continue into
pre-trial discovery.248 Although the Panel found that the plaintiffs
explained the price-fixing conspiracy aimed at China, India, and Brazil
with sufficient facts, the complaint provided only a conclusory
statement to connect that conspiracy to any effect in the United
States.249 Furthermore, any connection between the conspiracy aimed
at foreign countries and import or domestic commerce in the United
States had to be “direct.”250 For this analysis, the Panel referred to
United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, a Ninth Circuit decision that
defined an effect as “direct” under the FTAIA if “it follows as an
immediate consequence of the defendant’s activity.”251 If the conduct
occurs in a foreign country, but there are “uncertain intervening
245

Id. at 661.
Id. at 660.
247
Id. at 661.
248
Id. at 661-63. See supra text accompanying note 206.
249
Id. at 662 (“The problem with these generalized allegations is the absence
of specific factual content to support the asserted proposition that prices in China,
India, and Brazil serve as a ‘benchmark’ for prices in the United States and that this
benchmark, if it exists, has a strong relationship with the domestic potash market to
raise a plausible inference that the defendants’ foreign anticompetitive conduct has a
‘direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect’ on domestic or import
commerce.”).
250
Id. at 661.
251
Id. at 662 (quoting United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672,
680 (9th Cir. 2004; citing Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607,
618 (1992)). The Ninth Circuit case derives the definition of “direct” from the
Weltover decision, where the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act was at issue.
246

285
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol8/iss2/3

36

Caplan: The FTAIA in Its Proper Place: Merits, Jurisdiction, and Statutor

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 8, Issue 2

Spring 2013

developments” before there is an effect on import or domestic
commerce, then the effect is not direct.252 “Ultimately,” the Panel
concluded, “the connection asserted in the complaint between the
alleged cartelized prices of potash overseas and the domestic price of
potash is too speculative and indirect to state an actionable claim
under the FTAIA’s direct-effects exception.”253
The Panel vacated the lower court’s ruling based on its Twombly
analysis.254 However, it refused to upset the precedent in United
Phosphorus, and remained silent on whether the FTAIA affected a
court’s jurisdiction or established an element of an antitrust claim.255
This decision occurred despite the court’s acknowledgement that the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Animal Science Products, Inc. v.
China Minmetals Corp. had applied the Arbaugh bright-line test and
held that the FTAIA only establishes an element of an antitrust
claim.256 The decision to revisit United Phosphorus was left to the
plaintiffs’ subsequent appeal to the Seventh Circuit sitting en banc.
3. The en banc Decision
The Seventh Circuit’s en banc panel found that the “nascent idea”
expressed in Judge Wood’s dissent in United Phosphorus had “now
become a firmly established principle of statutory construction.”257
The series of decisions that led to the bright-line test in Arbaugh
convinced the en banc panel that the time had come to reconsider its
holding in United Phosphorus.258 The Supreme Court’s decision in
252

Id.
Id. at 663.
254
Id. at 663-64.
255
Id. at 659.
256
Id. 659 n.3 (citing Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654
F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2011)). In its footnote, the Panel acknowledges that the Third
Circuit based its decision, in part, on the dissent in United Phosphorus.
257
Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 852 (7th Cir. 2012) (en
banc) [hereinafter Minn-Chem II].
258
Id. (citing Union Pacific R. Co. v. Locomotive Eng’rs, 558 U.S. 67 (2009);
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corporation, 546 U.S. 500; United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625;
253
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Morrison presented a compelling factor.259 Judge Wood, this time
writing for the unanimous en banc panel, referred to the Court’s
finding that “limitations on the extraterritorial reach of a statute
describe what conduct the law purports to regulate and what lies
outside its reach.”260 By way of analogy, the FTAIA, like § 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act, lacks language in the text of the statute
that explicitly references a federal court’s jurisdiction.261 Therefore,
under the Arbaugh test, the court should infer that that the statute’s
provisions regulate the conduct the statute purports to regulate, not the
ability of the court to adjudicate the matter before it.262 Henceforth, in
the district and appellate courts of the Seventh Circuit, the FTAIA
establishes an element of an antitrust cause of action.263
With that matter behind it, the en banc panel was left with the task
of determining whether the plaintiffs’ complaint could survive a
motion to dismiss.264 The first issue for the court was to determine
precisely what forms of commerce the FTAIA excluded from the reach
of the Sherman Act. The district court and the three-judge panel
presented interpretations that did not completely satisfy the en banc
panel.265 However, between the two courts, the interpretation offered

Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick, 130 S.Ct. 1237, 1243 (2010); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540
U.S. 443, 455 (2004) (Ginsburg, J. dissenting); Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better
Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998); Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki 131
S.Ct. 1197, 1202-03 (2011).).
259
Id. at 852 (“We can see no way to distinguish this case from Morrison.”).
260
Id.
261
Id.
262
Id. (“When Congress decides to strip the courts of subject-matter
jurisdiction in a particular area, it speaks clearly. The FTAIA, however, never comes
close to using the word ‘jurisdiction’ or any commonly accepted synonym. Instead,
it speaks to the ‘conduct’ to which the Sherman Act (or the Federal Trade
Commission Act) applies. This is the language of elements, not jurisdiction.”).
263
Id.
264
Id. at 853.
265
See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
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by the three-judge panel proved, for the most part, to be more
attractive.266
Under the en banc panel’s interpretation, the FTAIA categorizes
two forms of commerce: foreign and import. If antitrust conduct
occurs within “import trade or import commerce,” then the Sherman
Act applies. As a general matter, the Sherman Act does not cover
antitrust conduct “involving trade or commerce with foreign nations.”
However, if the antitrust conduct occurring in foreign commerce has a
“direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on import trade
or commerce, then the Sherman Act does apply to that conduct. All of
this is in line with Empagran.267
Having established the proper interpretive framework, the en banc
panel then narrowed its analysis and defined certain terms within the
FTAIA with more specificity.268 First, the court defined a test for the
kinds of transactions that constitute “pure import commerce.”269 Under
the situation in Minn-Chem, “[t]hose transactions that are directly
between the plaintiff purchasers and defendant cartel members are the
import commerce of the United States in this sector.”270 This
conclusion follows logically from the fact that the plaintiff purchasers
were U.S. entities, and all of the defendant producers were located
outside of the United States.271
Because the facts in the plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that part of
the price-fixing conspiracy occurred through transactions specifically
not occurring with the United States or Canada, the court next
questioned what constituted “trade or commerce with foreign
nations.”272 The court found this to be self-evident based on the facts
266

Minn-Chem II, 683 F.3d 853-54.
Id. at 854; see discussion supra Part II.B.
268
Minn-Chem II, 683 F.3d. at 855.
269
Id.
270
Id.
271
Id.
272
Id. at 655-56. The court refers to Canpotex, the Canadian marketing and
sales agent for Agrium, Mosaic, and Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, and the fact that
it specifically did not sell to purchasers in the United States and Canada. The court
presumes that Canpotex was included in the complaint because it was “jointly and
267
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that alleged the existence of an international cartel that raised prices
for potash sold directly to U.S. purchasers.273 Those sales were
“plainly” foreign commerce.274 The next step was to determine
whether that foreign commerce had a “direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect” on United States import or interstate
commerce.275
As to whether the cartel’s foreign conduct had a substantial and
reasonably foreseeable effect on domestic or import commerce, the
court quickly concluded that the facts alleged by the plaintiffs, if true,
satisfied those requirements.276 What was in dispute, and where the en
banc panel disagreed with the three-judge panel, was what showing
must be made to show “direct” effects.277 The en banc panel thought
that the lower court’s reliance on the Ninth Circuit’s “immediate
consequence” definition, itself derived from an interpretation of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, was “misplaced.”278 The Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice advocated an alternative
definition for “direct,” meaning instead, “a reasonably proximate
causal nexus” (“nexus test”).279 The court found this definition
comported with the language of the FTAIA better than “immediate
consequence” because an immediate effect from foreign commerce
would likely, if not necessarily, impact import commerce.280 Such a

severally liable” for participating in the conspiracy raising the prices charged by the
direct sellers to the United States market.
273
Id. at 656.
274
Id.
275
Id.
276
Id.
277
Id.
278
Id. at 657.
279
Id. (citing Makan Delrahim, Drawing the Boundaries of the Sherman Act:
Recent Developments in the Application of the Antitrust Laws to Foreign Conduct,
61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 415, 430 (2005) (remarks of the Deputy Assistant
Attorney General)).
280
Id.
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reading is either redundant or ignores the fact that the FTAIA already
excludes import commerce from its coverage.281
The nexus test also avoids the concern expressed by the threejudge panel that any foreign company that has import business in the
United States would be at risk of violating the Sherman Act simply by
participating in a foreign joint-selling arrangement, which may or may
not affect United States import or domestic commerce.282 First, as a
direct participant in United States import commerce, this hypothetical
foreign company would already have to comply with U.S. law.283
Second, the company’s foreign sales would still need to meet the
threshold for “effects” on interstate commerce established in the case
law;284 if that threshold is not met, then the foreign company’s conduct
will not face scrutiny under the Sherman Act.285 Finally, if the foreign
company’s conduct is foreign commerce usually excluded by the
FTAIA, then that conduct must cause a “direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect” before the Sherman Act applies.286
The court next turned to whether the plaintiffs’ complaint
plausibly alleged that the defendants’ conduct fell either into the
category of import commerce, or the category of foreign commerce,
thus meeting the direct effect test.287 On the facts before the court, the
en banc panel concluded that much of the complaint alleged import
transactions.288 Under Hartford Fire, the Sherman Act applies to those
transactions if the conduct was meant to produce, and did in fact
produce, a “substantial” effect on United States domestic

281

Id.
Id.
283
Id.
284
Id. (citing Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993);
Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322 (1991).
285
Id. at 857-58.
286
Id.
287
Id. at 858.
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Id.
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commerce.289 The import transactions, according to the court, met
these requirements, and therefore were subject to the Sherman Act.290
As for the defendants’ conduct alleged to have occurred in foreign
commerce, the court repeated its finding that the facts presented by the
plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a substantial and reasonably foreseeable
effect on domestic or import commerce.291 The specific allegations
that the defendants negotiated production levels among themselves; set
prices for the Chinese, Indian, and Brazilian markets; and then used
those cartel-determined prices to serve as a benchmark for prices
charged to purchasers in the United States were sufficient to meet the
“direct” effect test.292 Judge Wood compared the “benchmark” practice
allegedly employed by the defendants to the common uses of
benchmarks like, among other examples, the London Interbank Offer
Rate (LIBOR) for interest rates in the credit market.293 The court
concluded that the plaintiffs’ complaint plausibly pleaded facts that
supported the inference that the defendants’ cartel activity was a
proximate cause of the price increases in the United States.294
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Ramifications for the Courts and Attorneys
What perhaps appeared, at the time of the Hartford Fire decision,
to be a marginal squabble over subject-matter jurisdiction eventually
inspired a careful reconsideration of how the entire federal judiciary
evaluates adjudicatory authority. As articulated in Arbaugh, the test
289

Id.
Id. at 858-59. (“The inference from these allegations is not just plausible
but compelling that the cartel meant to, and did in fact, keep prices artificially high
in the United States.”).
291
Id.
292
Id.
293
Id.
294
Id. (“It is no stretch to say that the foreign supply restrictions, and the
concomitant price increases forced upon Chinese purchasers, were a direct – that is,
proximate – cause of the subsequent price increases in the United States.”).
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that determines whether a federal statute grants a court subject-matter
jurisdiction is formal: does the statute’s text explicitly refer to a court’s
jurisdiction? After examining the text of the statute at issue, a simple
“yes” or “no” will suffice. Answer “yes,” and challenges to that
particular statute will require a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1).
Answer “no,” and challenges will require a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6), or later a call for summary judgment under Rule 56.295
A federal court contemplating an antitrust claim has an elegant
method for determining subject-matter jurisdiction through 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331.296 This method provides litigators with a clear delineation
between what defines jurisdiction and what constitutes the elements of
an antitrust cause of action. Attorneys can work more efficiently
because this delineation reduces confusion and uncertainty over which
motions and procedures to follow in a lawsuit. Furthermore, as Judge
Wood noted in her dissent in United Phosphorus, it reduces the
potential that a jurisdictional inquiry will result in the consumption of
“enormous judicial resources.”297
As a matter of fairness, the Minn-Chem decision strikes the proper
balance between plaintiffs and defendants. A district court’s
determination of whether an antitrust plaintiff’s complaint meets the
FTAIA’s requirements now requires an inquiry under a 12(b)(6)
motion. This requirement gives an advantage to plaintiffs because the
inquiry is limited to the pleadings, and the facts are read in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party. However, balance occurs at
295

United Phosphorus Ltd. V. Angus Chemical Company (United Phosphorus
II), 322 F.3d 942, 959 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (Wood, J. dissenting) (“We should
not adopt a perverse decision just because parties have chosen to file motions under
Rule 12(b)(1) instead of 12(b)(6) or Rule 56, or because courts have unquestioningly
adopted the diction of ‘subject-matter jurisdiction’ without careful examination.”).
296
See, e.g., JEAN FORD BRENNAN, THE ELEGANT SOLUTION. xi (1967) (“In the
world of mathematics, when the solution to a problem exhibits precision, neatness
and simplicity, it is said to be ‘elegant.’”). Thanks to Kevin McClure, Research
Librarian, Chicago-Kent College of Law Library, for tracking down the preceding
definition. In United Phosphorus, Judge Evans recognized a level of “purity” to the
rationale behind finding jurisdiction through § 1331; see United Phosphorus II, 322
F.3d at 950. “Elegant,” as defined here, is perhaps a better description.
297
United Phosphorus II. 322 F.3d at 957 (Wood, J. dissenting).
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the appellate level, because review of a trial court’s disposition of a
motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6), or for summary judgment, is de
novo.298 This procedural distinction is important because an appellate
court would not have to defer to the district court’s findings of fact.299
Furthermore, the appellate court would be able to raise its own inquiry
into whether the principle of international comity would have any
bearing on the case.300 Review under Rule 12(b)(1), however, would
require deference on the part of the appellate court toward the district
court’s findings of fact, and it would limit the appellate court’s ability
to examine the effect of the principle of international comity on the
case.301
B. Ramifications on the Principle of International Comity and the
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
Filed under the category of “unfinished business” left over from
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Hartford Fire,302 the Seventh Circuit did not
rule on whether the principle of international comity counseled against
an extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act in Minn-Chem.303
This avoidance was due, in part, because the defendants did not raise
the issue on appeal.304 However, now that challenges to subject-matter
jurisdiction are off the table, vis-à-vis the FTAIA, foreign defendants
would be well advised to argue in their pleadings that a comity
analysis305 limits the Sherman Act’s applicability.
298
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300
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Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817-18 (1993).
303
Minn-Chem II, 683 F.3d at 860.
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Id.
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See, e.g., Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 818-19 (citing Restatement (Third),
supra note 65, §§ 403(1), 403(2)(a)-(c), 403(2)(g)-(h) (describing the inquiry a court
should make to determine whether the principle of international comity bars an
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act)).
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The presumption against extraterritoriality also received no
attention from the Seventh Circuit, again because the defendants did
not raise the issue on appeal.306 This omission might signal that, so far
as the FTAIA and the Sherman Act are concerned, the presumption has
been thoroughly rebutted by nearly seventy years of extraterritorial
application of the Sherman Act in federal courts. However, the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum307 may give pause to those ready to consider the matter
settled. The issue in Kiobel was whether the 224-year-old Alien Tort
Statute308 (“ATS”) granted federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction
over tort claims arising from violations of international law committed
in a foreign country.309 This case was novel because the ATS is
“strictly jurisdictional.”310
To determine whether the ATS granted jurisdiction over the
conduct that had occurred in a foreign country, the Court invoked the
presumption against extraterritoriality.311 This was the first application
of the presumption to a jurisdictional statute since the Court’s decision

306

Minn-Chem II, 683 F.3d. at 860.
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 569 U.S __ at (slip op., at 1) (2013),
2013 WL 1628935 *1.
308
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). The text of the statute: “The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” N.B.: This Case Note
substitutes “international law” for the phrase “law of nations”; for the purposes of
this Note, the terms are interchangeable.
309
Kiobel, 569 U.S. __ at (slip op., at 3), 2013 WL 1628935, at *4. The
plaintiffs, Nigerian-born residents of the United States, alleged that oil companies
operating in the Niger River delta had aided and abetted the Nigerian Government in
committing crimes in violation of international law. The plaintiffs alleged that the
Nigerian government committed these violations of international law: extrajudicial
killings; crimes against humanity; torture and cruel treatment; arbitrary arrest and
detention; violations of the rights of life, liberty, security, and association; forced
exile; and property destruction. Id. at (slip op., at 1), at *3.
310
Id. at 569 U.S. __ at (slip op., at 5), at *5 (quoting Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 542 U.S. 692, 713 (2004)).
311
Id. at 569 U.S. __ at (slip op., at 4-6), at *5-*6.
307
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in Morrison.312 The Court reasoned that the policy concerns justifying
the application of the canon to a “merits question”313 also applied to a
jurisdictional statute like the ATS.314 Armed with the presumption,
Chief Justice Roberts found that nothing in the text or the historical
background of the ATS rebutted the presumption.315 Because all of the
relevant conduct took place outside of the United States, the plaintiffs’
case could not proceed in federal court.316
The Court nevertheless adopted a legal test that left open the
possibility that the presumption against extraterritoriality may be
overcome. Chief Justice Roberts wrote that:
… even where the claims touch and concern the territory of
the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to
displace the presumption against extraterritorial application
…. Corporations are often present in many countries, and it
would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence
suffices. If Congress were to determine otherwise, a statute
more specific than the ATS would be required.317
This test suggests that the prerequisite facts upon which a federal court
may exercise ATS jurisdiction must show that the torts resulting from
a violation of international law have some discernible effect upon the
territory of the United States. The minimum size of that effect is more
than one arising from corporate presence. Presumably, without

312

See discussion supra Part II.D.
Kiobel, 569 U.S. __ at (slip op., at 4-5), 2013 WL 1628935, at *5 (citing
Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 130 S.Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010)) (“. . . [to] ensure
that the Judiciary does not erroneously adopt an interpretation of U.S. law that
carries foreign policy consequences not clearly intended by the political branches.”).
314
Id. at 569 U.S. __ at (slip op., at 6), at *6.
315
Id. at 569 U.S. __ at (slip op., at 7-12), at *6-*9.
316
Id. at 569 U.S. __ at (slip op., at 13-4), at *10.
317
Id. at 569 U.S. __ at (slip op., at 14), at *10 (citing Morrison, 130 S.Ct
2883-8).
313
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Congressional action to revise the ATS, future cases will determine the
sufficient quantum of effect to trigger ATS jurisdiction.318
Another way of looking at the Kiobel test is as an echo of the
FTAIA. Like the FTAIA, the Kiobel test divides claims into two
categories. Federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over only
one category: those tort claims arising from a violation of international
law occurring solely in the United States. The court justifies
jurisdiction over this first category of claims by citing the history of
the passage and early application of the ATS.319 The second category
consists of those tort claims arising from a violation of international
law occurring in a foreign country. For these claims, the ATS does not
grant subject-matter jurisdiction to federal courts. However, claims
may be moved from the second category and placed in the first, so
long as they “touch and concern” the territory of the United States
with “sufficient force” to justify the assertion of a federal court’s
jurisdiction.
The FTAIA and Minn-Chem reenter the discussion here because
what may be “sufficient force” to knock out the presumption against
extraterritoriality in the context of the ATS may have consequences on
whether the presumption still applies to antitrust laws. Although a
reasonable interpretation of the FTAIA’s direct effect test suggests that
the test implies “sufficient force,” a Supreme Court wanting to reassert
the presumption to the FTAIA could make a “sufficient force”
requirement a separate inquiry, as it did for the ATS in Kiobel. If the
bar for achieving sufficient force is set high enough, the Supreme
Court could curtail extraterritorial applications of U.S. antitrust laws
so that they occur only in the most extraordinary circumstances.
318

See, e.g., Kiobel, 569 U.S. __ at (slip op., at 1), 2013 WL 1628935, at *11
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
319
Id., 569 U.S. __ at (at slip op., at 8-10), 2013 WL 1628935 at *7. Chief
Justice Roberts recounts two cases occurring shortly before Congress passed the
ATS as giving impetus for the passage of the law. Each involved a foreign diplomat
and violations of “the rights of ambassadors,” one of three areas of “international
law” recognized in that era. The violations of international law occurred within the
territory of the United States. Two cases invoked the ATS shortly after it was passed
and also concerned conduct within United States territory.

296
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2013

47

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 3

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 8, Issue 2

Spring 2013

This possibility may not be completely farfetched, especially in
light of Justice Scalia’s Hartford Fire dissent. There, he referred to
EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (“Aramco”), where the Court
found that “boilerplate language” indicating Title VII’s scope over a
variety of forms of commerce did not overcome the presumption
against extraterritoriality.320 By way of comparison, Scalia wrote: “The
Sherman Act contains similar ‘boilerplate language,’ [to that contained
in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] and if the question [of
whether the Sherman Act applied extraterritorially] were not governed
by precedent, it would be worth considering whether that presumption
controls the outcome here.”321
CONCLUSION
The Minn-Chem decision provides the counter-argument to
reapplying the presumption to the Sherman Act. This is, in part, a
consequence of the Seventh Circuit’s endorsement of the nexus test to
show direct effect. If the court had adopted the “immediate
consequence” test, it would have given foreign companies a blueprint
on how to construct a price-fixing cartel that the Sherman Act could
not reach. Foreign companies would simply agree to control
production and fix prices for sales to any country that has no, or at
most a weak, antitrust enforcement regime; then they could use those
prices to set the benchmark for prices charged to American customers.
The nexus test ensures that this method of conspiracy will be subject
to U.S. antitrust laws.
Judge Wood also argued, at the close of the Minn-Chem decision,
that reliance on the countries where the foreign potash producers were
located to put a stop to the cartel would be misplaced.322 Canada,
320

Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 814 (1993) (citing
EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 251 (1991)). The
specific language in Title VII is “any activity, business, or industry in commerce.”
Scalia compares that language to the Sherman Act’s phrase, “commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations.”
321
Id.
322
Minn-Chem II, 683 F.3d 845, 860 (7th Circ. 2012) (en banc).
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Russia, and Belarus have no incentive to stop the cartel so long as the
benefit of extracting monopoly rents from customers outside of their
countries outweighed any potential losses.323 “It is the U.S. authorities
or private plaintiffs,” she wrote, “who have the incentive—and the
right—to complain about overcharges paid as a result of the potash
cartel, and whose interests will be sacrificed if the law is interpreted
not to permit this kind of case.”324 After Minn-Chem, the Sherman Act
can continue what it was meant to do: protect United States
consumers, deter anticompetitive conduct, and maintain a free and fair
market.
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